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BOOK REVIEWS
selves and follow in correct chronological order, there is something of an
anticlimatic effect about them after the drama of the debate at Valladolid.
Perhaps Dr. Hanke has done this deliberately, to emphasize his theme that
the struggle which Montesinos started is not yet over.
For those readers whose Hispanic-American history has been gleaned
from the few remaining writers who still glibly refer to the Spaniards as
ruthless, thoughtless gold-seekers and Indian enslavers, Dr. Hanke's care-
fully- documented study of the Spanish struggle for justice in the conquest
of America will come as a surprising but welcome revelation of the truth.
This book, however, has a deeper significance than the mere setting straight
of the historical record. In the shock of the impact of a new world culture
on the Spanish character of the sixteenth century-with its individualism,
legalism, religiosity, and passion for extremes-a struggle of ideas began,
or took on new significance, to add important chapters in the story of man's
attempt to get along with his neighbor. Dr. Hanke concludes:
"Whatever means men develop, however, to destroy their fellow men,
the real problems between nations do not lie in the realm of mechanics.
They lie in the more difficult field of human relationships. Some Spaniards
long ago discerned this truth, which the whole world must understand
today if it is to survive. The specific methods used to apply the theories
worked out by sixteenth-century Spaniards are now as outmoded as the
blowguns with which Indians shot poisoned arrows at the conquistadores,
but the ideals which some Spaniards sought to put into practice as they
opened up the New World will never lose their shining brightness as long
as men believe that other peoples have a right to live, that just methods
may be found for the conduct of relations between peoples, and that
essentially all the peoples of the world are men."
IONE STUSSY WRIGHT ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF HIsroRy
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
COURTS ON TRIAL. By Jerome Frank. Princeton : Princeton University Press,
1949. Pp. xii, 441. $500.
LAWYERS, Judge Frank believes, "half believe a lot of stork-stories con-
cerning the birth process of judicial decisions." Too few lawyers, judges
and law professors have "been willing to speak out plainly, even to other
lawyers, about the actualities of court-house behavior." "Legends and myths
have grown up about the judiciary which serve to obscure realities." Con-
sequently, there is a needless public cynicism about lawyers and courts.
In this book, Judge Frank takes all lawyers and laymen into his confidencc
and tells them the facts of life about the judicial process.
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To symbolize the judicial process, Judge Frank employs the familiar
Frankian equation, R x F = D. R signifies the rule of law, F signifies the
facts, and D signifies the decision. If a judge's decision is wrong, it may
be for any of three reasons: he may have adopted the wrong rule of law;
he may have incorrectly found the facts; or he may have improperly applied
the law to the facts.
According to Frank, most legal scholars are "wizards"-"addicts of legal
magic"-wha proclaim that in most cases the rules of law are fairly
certain and their application practically automatic, thus enabling a com-
petent lawyer to predict the outcome of most cases. This is due to their
failure to understand the importance of trial court fact-finding. These
"legal magic mongers" might "be described by a wag as mildly schizoid,
since they insist on portraying as existent a legal system which plainly
does not exist." In this category, Frank classifies such highly respected
legal thinkers as Roscoe Pound, John Dickinson, Justice Cardozo, Morris
Cohen and Edwin Patterson.
Contrasted with this group-which Frank seems to believe includes
most of the legal profession-is the group of American lawyers known
as the "legal realists."' This group Frank sub-divides into two classes,
viz., "rule skeptics" and "fact skeptics."
The "rule skeptics" are also "magic addicts." They strive for greater
certainty and consider it socially desirable that lawyers should be able to
predict for their clients the decisions in most law suits not yet commenced.
They believe the formal legal rules enunciated in courts' opinions (the
paper rules) too often prove unreliable as guides in the prediction of
decisions. Behind the paper rules, they believe they can discover some
real rules which will serve as more reliable prediction instruments. "These
skeptics cold-shoulder the trial courts" and concentrate almost exclusively
on upper-court opinions. Karl Llewellyn is "perhaps the most outstanding
representative" and "perhaps the most brilliant" of the rule skeptics. But:
"He is like a color-blind artist attempting to paint the vivid colors of a
sun-drenched autumn landscape. His shying away from lower-court fact-
finding indicates - . . the sort of reluctance to observe disturbing court-
room realities which justifies classifying him as a second-class wizard."
The "fact skeptics" (lawyers "who abandon legal magic") include among
others, Dean Leon Green, Max Radin, Thurman Arnold, William 0.
1. With reference to this group, Dean Pound once said, " . . . realism is used in
the sense in which artists employ it rather than in the philosophical sense. Because the ugly
exists in nature, the realist in art insists on portraying the ugly not merely in its ugliness
but often in exaggerated ugliness. So, too, the juristic realist insists on the alogical and
unrational features of the judicial process, and not only stresses them to the exclusion
of other features, but often exaggerates then. The term 'realism,' therefore is a mere
boast." Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 51 HARv. L. REV. 777, 799 (1938).
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Douglas (now Mr. Justice Douglas) and perhaps Professor E. M. Morgan.
Fred Rodell, notwithstandin4 his excoriating book, Woe Unto You Lawyers 1,
failed to make the grade; he is "not a fact-skeptic but a rule-skeptic
(although a radical one)." The fact-skeptics also peer behind the paper
rules; but they go much further. "Their primary interest is in the trial
courts. No matter how precise or definite may be the formal legal rules,
... no matter what the discoverable uniformities behind these formal rules,
nevertheless, it is impossible, and will always be impossible, because of
the elusiveness of the facts on which decisions turn, to predict future
decisions in most (not all) law-suits not yet begun or not yet tried."
Judge Frank "was one of the original fact-skeptics."2 He vividly illus-
trates their viewpoint by the following example. Mr. Sensible, who is about
to sign a contract with Mr. Smart for the purchase of some goods, calls
his lawyer and asks, "Will this contract fully protect me? If Smart fails
to deliver those goods, and the market goes up, can I collect the difference
from him?" According to the conventional theory, the lawyer should be
able to advise Sensible as to his legal rights with a high degree of cer-
tainty. Frank denies the correctness of that theory; he says that, "Sensible's
lawyer cannot tell him with any high degree of certainty what Sensible's
rights are-that is, what the court will decide." Even though the contract
is in writing, the parol evidence rule "is subject to so many exceptions that
it resembles a swiss-cheese with more holes than cheese." E.g., it would not
prevent Smart from introducing evidence to show that his signature was
forged; he was induced to sign the contract by fraud; it was intended as a
sham; mutual mistake; a subsequent cancellation or release; and many
other defenses. The decision, then, will depend upon such variable factors
as mistaken witnesses, perjured witnesses, missing or dead witnesses,
mistaken judges, inattentive judges, biased judges, crooked judges, inatten-
tive juries, biased juries, incompetent lawyers, crooked lawyers, lost docu-
ments, etc. Therefore, "Only a soothsayer, a prophet, or a person gifted
with clairvoyance, can tell a man what are his enforceable rights arising
out of any particular transaction, or against any other person, before a
law-suit with respect to that transaction or that person has arisen." "In
short, a legal right is usually a bet, a wager, or the chancy outcome of a
possible future law suit."
Besides his criticism of our lack of emphasis on the importance of trial
court fact-finding, Judge Frank also discusses and severely criticizes the
adversary method of conducting trials ( the "fighting method," he calls it) ;
2. Although at times Judge Frank seems to be almost a complete skeptic, at other
times he seems to be quite sure of his postulates. He does not seem to be as skeptical as
Descartes professed to be when he said he was so skeptical that he doubted whether he
doubted anything. (Descartes believed, however, that one who doubts cannot doubt the
reality of his doubting.)
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the jury system; the prevailing methods of selecting and training trial
judges; the wearing of robes by judges ("robe-ism") ; the present methods
of legal education and many other aspects cf "court-house government."
He gives very interesting and enlightening discussions of the gestalt in
trial court decisions, legal science and legal engineering, precedents and
stability, codification, legislation and judicial interpretation, legal reason-
ing, natural law, classicism and romanticism, and numerous other subjects.
I was particularly interested in his chapter on legal education. He believes
our "myopic 'case-system,'" which got its present mood from a "brilliant
neurotic," Langdell, "has made the task of the teacher as complicated as
possible"; even "the teacher who is a genius cannot overcome the obstacles."
Under this system, "law students are like future horticulturists studying
solely cut flowers; or like future architects studying merely pictures of
buildings"; they "resemble prospective dog-breeders who never see any-
thing but stuffed dogs." Judge Frank believes that three years is too long
for teaching the "relatively simple technique" of analyzing upper court
opinions, distinguishing cases, and constructing, modifying or criticizing
legal doctrines. "Intelligent men can learn that dialectical technique in
about six months." To get back on the track from which the law schools
have "fatefully strayed under Langdell's neurotic wizardry," Frank recom-
mends that "lawyer schools" be created in which students would study law
in action in courts, administrative agencies and law offices. Like many
other law professors, I also believe the casebook method (although probably
the best single method of teaching) is decidedly overworked. We have
become slaves to it. Ianv of Judge Frank's concrete suggestions deserve
careful study. The problem is much more complex, however, than it is made
to appear in this book.'
Other reforms which Judge Frank suggests (a few of which have
been adopted to some extent) include: giving the government responsibility
for seeing that "all practically available, important, evidence" is intro-
duced in civil cases; having trial judges play a more active part in examining
witnesses; requiring examination of witnesses to be more humane and
intelligent; permitting trial judges to call testimonial experts to testify
concerning the detectible fallacies of witnesses; abolishing most of the
exclusionary rules of evidence; providing liberal pre-trial discovery in
3. I disagree with some of Judge Frank's factual assumptions as well as with many
of his concIluions. For instance, I think law students and law professors are much more
cognizant of court-room realities than he seems to believe. He says Professor Berle
told him in 1931 that "90 per cent of teachers in our leading law schools had never so
much as ventured into a court-room." That statement is not true today, and I do not
believe it was true in 1931 or at any other time. Perhaps it will be corrected by application
of the normal coefficient of cxaggeratinn. I agree, of course, that personal acquaintance with
practical realities is helpful to a law professor and that there are many professors who
should have more practical experience.
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criminal cases; requiring special education for trial judges, "such educa-
tion to include intensive psychological self-exploration by each prospective
trial judge"; educating future prosecutors so that they will obtain and
introduce all important evidence, including that which favors the accused;
abolition of the third degree; requiring judges to quit wearing official robes,
conduct trials more informally and publish special findings of fact in all
cases; abolition of jury trials except in major criminal cases or, at least,
if we retain the jury system, require special verdicts in all cases, use
informed "special juries" and educate men in schools for jury service;
revising "most of the legal rules" so as to encourage the openly disclosed
individualization of law suits by trial judges; permitting a trial judge to
sit with the appellate court on an appeal from his decision, but without a
vote; having talking movies of trials; and teaching non-lawyers that trial
courts are more important than appellate courts.
Surprisingly, Judge Frank scarcely touches upon two of the most
important aspects of court house government, viz., the expense of litigation
and the almost endless delays incident to obtaining a judicial decision.
Undoubtedly he must be as disturbed by these problems as he is by those
he discusses at length. Regardless of how much we improve trial court fact-
finding, we still cannot secure justice unless the litigious process is made
economical and expeditious.
Judge Frank's research in writing this book is anomalous. After indicting
other legal scholars, the legal profession, the law schools and practically
everybody else for their failure to make first-hand observations of court
room realities, one would expect Judge Frank to tell us in this book about
the study he has made af the trial courts and what he found. He does
almost everything but that. To prove his thesis, he employs analogies and
quotations from writings on almost all branches of learning-including his-
tory, psychology, theology, biology, philosophy, medicine, economics, primi-
tive wizardry, sociology, mathematics, anthropology, physics, music, etc.-
but he tells us practically nothing of his own observations of the goings-on
in trial courts; and the authors of most of the books which he cites have
probably thought no more about the problem than the average man in
the street. What he says is very interesting, but his method seems to
conflict with his thesis.
At any rate, Judge Frank has vividly discussed many important judicial
problems. I, too, am more or less a "fact-skeptic." Contrary to Judge Frank,
however, I have always supposed that most lawyers were of about the same
view and, generally, openly admitted it. Even from laymen we quite fre-
quently hear such remarks as, "The only sure thing about a law suit is the
uncertainty," "A party must prove his case by a preponderance of perjury,"
"Justice is not blind if one of the parties is a pulchritudinous blonde wearing
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a short skirt," and similar cynical maledictions. But, as Mark Twain said
about the weather, everybody talks about it, but nobody does anything
about it. Perhaps Judge Frank's caricature may incite people to action.
Most readers will be impressed by the author's intelligent criticism of
our legal system and his bold suggestions for legal reforms. They will be even
more impressed by his style af writing and the scope of his inquiry. Judge
Frank's fluent style of writing (accentuated by vicious invectives, sterling
similes, meteoric metaphors, and perhaps unconsciously hypercritical hyper-
boles), combined with his phenomenal erudition in a myriad of subjects,
and interspersed with good sense and nonsense, give this book a satirical,
titilating tingle like that of a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta.
GEORGE W. STENGEL PROFESSOR OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS. By Mitchell Wendell.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1949. Pp. 298. $4.00.
To many it is familiar learning that the pronouncements of the United
States Supreme Court indicating the instances in which federal courts
exercising a concurrent jurisdiction with local state courts in which they
apply state law, may or may not reach results at variance with those of the
local state courts, have deep governmental as well as legal significations;
and each of these meanings draws substance from the other. Lawyers who
fail to see beyond the legal dogma in these decisions to their meaning in
terms of division of governmental power, take a myopic and one-sided view
of the judicial process which can result only in an incomplete under-
standing of the law. Political scientists who do not understand the pragmatic
relations of these legal dogmas to our federal system of government can
hardly understand that government, for in a real sense the nature of our
government is largely what it is because the judicial evaluations and policies
behind these dogmas have made it so.
Mitchell Wendell's Relations Between the Federal and State Courts.
No. 555 of the Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, edited by
the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, assumes that
while political scientists are familiar with the governmental significance of
judicial decisions interpreting the due process and commerce clauses of the
United States Constitution, most of them do not understand the importance
to the science of government of the judicial decisions in the field which
lawyers commonly describe as federal jurisdiction and procedure. They do
not even recognize that there exists- any connection at all between such
decisions and the science of government. The author finds that most political
